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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
SecureCore is a research project funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) to 
investigate the fundamental architectural features required for trustworthy operation of 
mobile computing devices such as smart cards, embedded controllers and hand-held 
computers. The goal is to provide secure processing and communication features for 
resource-constrained platforms, without compromise of performance, size, cost or energy 
consumption. In this environment, the security must also be built-in, transparent and 
flexible. 
 
This document describes the interface to the SecureCore operating system (SCOS) for 
Phase 0 of the SecureCore project.  Phase 0 is a rapid prototype with only enough 
specified functionality to demonstrate progress and potential capabilities of the 
SecureCore project.  The SCOS interface includes a software emulation of the Secret-
Protecting (SP) processor extensions [1]. Because this is a Phase 0 functional 
specification, this document is considered to be a rapid-prototype specification within a 
spiral life cycle model.  This document is expected to change as experience is gained with 
the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) environment or as better approaches are 
identified. 
 
A description of the software architecture and definitions can be found elsewhere [2].  
This document assumes the reader is familiar with the architecture and terminology of the 
SecureCore project. 
1.2 Limitations 
The Phase 0 implementation will incorporate only a subset of the envisioned SecureCore 
functionality, and will not be developed with high assurance techniques or covert channel 
analysis.  The following lists the limitations on the SecureCore functionality implemented 
in Phase 0: 
• The LPSK runs in PL0 without using any hardware support to create virtual 
machines. 
• The SCSS runs in PL0. 
• The SCOS executes in privilege level 1 (PL1), and applications execute in PL3. 
• There is only one process per partition. 
• There is only one application in PL3 per partition. 
• A limited number of active partitions are supported. 
• The trusted path application (TPA) is not supported. 
• Detection of the invocation of the secure attention key (SAK) will be handled in 
PL0 and will not be reflected outside of PL0. 
• There is no support for the setting of a session level. 
• The keyboard and screen are the only exported devices.  They will be attached by 
the LPSK during initialization. 
• Graphics mode is not supported for the screen. 
• Only one hard disk is supported. 
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• Networking is not supported. 
• Non-blocked I/O is the only mode supported for exported devices (i.e., blocked 
I/O is not supported).  For example, if an SCOS call is made to read from the 
keyboard device, and there is no data in the keyboard buffer, then an error is 
returned to the caller.  Applications will therefore need to poll devices to 
determine if data is available. 
• Creation of persistent memory objects during run-time is not supported. 
• A file abstraction for accessing memory objects is not supported. 
• Handheld devices are not supported. 
• All the device driver support resides in PL0. 
• Sensitivity labels are not supported. 
1.3 Phase 0 Process Abstraction 
The process abstraction is created by the LPSK. There is only one process per partition.  
Therefore, a process consists of all the subjects executing within a partition.  There can 
be up to three subjects per process.  The LPSK schedules processes in a round-robin 
fashion with a configurable fixed time slice. 
 
All applications execute in PL3, with one application per partition.  The Phase 0 SCOS 
does not support the scheduling of multiple applications within a partition. 
1.4 Approach to Authentication in Phase 0 
The SCOS provides a service that allows an application to authenticate a user by means 
of a password.  It is the responsibility of the application to prompt the user for a username 
and password, then request authentication from the SCOS.  A SecureCore computer is 
intended to support one physical user at a time, so the SCOS will only support one logged 
in user per process.  Because there is no communication between SCOS instantiations, 
there is no concept of single-sign-on for the SecureCore computer in Phase 0.  This may 
require a user to log in more than once if authentication is required by more than one 
application. 
 
A separate password database should be maintained by each instantiation of the SCOS, 
otherwise there is the potential for password inconsistency and covert channels.  The 
authentication data is stored in a password file as a hash of the expected password for 
each user.   
 
When a user is successfully authenticated, the SCOS returns a success code to the calling 
application.  The consequence of a successful authentication or logout is application-
dependent.   
1.5 Secondary Storage in Phase 0 
The use of secondary storage is limited in Phase 0.  All secondary storage objects that are 
needed by any subject must exist prior to LPSK initialization.  The creation of secondary 
storage objects during run-time is not supported.  However, there may be support in 
Phase 0 for flushing (i.e., updating) a memory segment to its source object on secondary 
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storage.  The flush system call is a low priority implementation item and may not be 
implemented in Phase 0. 
 
The boot loader in Phase 0 is based on an open-source utility called grub [3].  It is used to 
load the LPSK into memory, and to perform additional LPSK initialization functions.  A 
particularly useful feature of grub (for Phase 0) is the ability to read many different file 
system formats, which will allow Phase 0 executables and data to be placed in a familiar 
environment.  For example, the PL3 applications can be stored in a FAT32 file system 
with a location such as “/applications/shell.out”. 
1.6 Referencing Devices 
Device references with the SCOS will take the form of a (major, minor) tuple, where 
“major” refers to a category of devices, and the minor number refers to a specific 
instantiation of a device.  The keyboard and monitor devices are logically attached by the 
LPSK during initialization of all active partitions, with the associated (major, minor) 
tuples passed to each PL during their initialization.  Phase 0 will not support the dynamic 
attachment of other devices. 
1.7 Partition Focus 
The Trusted Management Layer (TML) detects the invocation of the secure attention key 
(SAK).  The use of the SAK in Phase 0 is to signal the TML to change the partition with 
focus.  Partition focus is changed on a round robin scheduling algorithm. For example, if 
partition0 has focus, then invoking the SAK will give focus to partition1.  Invoking the 
SAK again will give focus to partition2, etc.  The SAK in Phase 0 is “Alt-+” (i.e., the 
‘Alt’ key and the ‘+’ key pressed at the same time). 
1.8 Executable Requirements 
In order for the LPSK to load an executable file from secondary storage and prepare it for 
execution the following requirements must be met: 
• The executable file must be constructed in the 32-bit Linear Executable (LX) file 
format.  The development tools will generate this format when they are installed 
and configured per the instructions in a separate document. 
• The first executable instruction must be at offset 0.  This is dependent on the 
developer to write and link the code in a given order.  Detailed instructions will be 
provided in a separate document. 
1.9 Segments 
The Phase 0 abstraction for memory objects is a segment.  Segments are memory objects 
that are created by the LPSK during initialization and are accessible by the applications 
that are intended to use them, as directed with a configuration vector that is described in 
the next section. 
 
There are four kinds of segments supported by the LPSK: 
• Default Segments that are created by the LPSK as a result of loading an 
executable file are referred to as default segments.  Default segments 
SecureCore Software Architecture: SCOS Functional Specification 
             Trustworthy Commodity Computation and Communication 4 
are the code segments, data segments and stack segments that are 
declared in the executable file. 
• Dseg A dseg is an additional data segment that is initialized from a non-
executable file.  In other words, it is data that is not compiled into the 
executable file.  For example, an application may need to access data 
that may change over time, such as a list of valid e-mail addresses.  
Therefore, it may be wise to put the data into a separate file rather 
than compile it into the executable.  Selectors to the optional dsegs 
are provided by the SCOS to the application, as described in Section 
3. 
• Mseg An mseg is an un-initialized data segment.  A typical use of an mseg 
is the allocation of run-time memory that cannot be compiled into an 
executable file.  Selectors to the optional msegs are provided by the 
SCOS to the application, as described in Section 3.  Msegs are not 
persistent across system reboots. 
• Gseg A gseg is a gate segment.  It is used to provide call gates between 
privilege levels.  PL3 application developers do not need to specify 
gsegs. 
1.10 Interface Categories 
The SCOS interfaces are separated into four parts: the PL3 initialization database, the 
PL3 configuration database, native call interfaces, and SP emulation call interfaces.   
 
The PL3 initialization database refers to a file that is used to configure the initial run-time 
environment for applications. 
 
The PL3 configuration database refers to information that is provided by the SCOS to an 
application during the initialization of the application.  An application uses the PL3 
configuration database to support its own functionality (e.g., the major and minor 
numbers for the attached devices). 
 
A native call interface is an SCOS run-time request that is accessible by applications.  
 
SP emulation call interfaces are run-time requests meant to support an emulation of some 
of the SP hardware features for demonstration purposes.  The emulation calls are 
accessible by applications. 
2 PL3 Initialization Database 
Each privilege level has its own initialization database.  These databases are used to 
create a configuration vector for the LPSK.  This is shown graphically in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Generation of the LPSK Configuration Vector 
The PL3 portion of the configuration vector is used by the LPSK to initialize PL3 in a 
way that will start the applications appropriately.  An off-line tool parses the input 
initialization databases and creates a binary configuration vector that is used by the LPSK 
during initialization.  Using text files for the initialization databases allows for easy 
configuration changes and change tracking. 
 
Comments within the PL3 initialization database may be inserted by preceding a string 
with a ‘#’.  All text that appears after a ‘#’ and up to the end of the line is considered a 
comment and is not processed by the off-line tool.  The end of the line is given by the 
ASCII line-feed character (0x0a).  Blank lines are also considered comments, i.e., lines 
that consist only of ASCII tabs (0x09) and space (0x20) ending in the line-feed 
character). 
 
The following syntax is used first to declare the location of application executables on 
secondary disk, which allows the LPSK to find them and load them into memory. 
 
 CODE[partition] = path; 
 
“CODE” is a reserved word.  The other parameters in the above syntax are explained 
below:  
• partition is a number representing the partition the associated code should be 
loaded in (e.g., 0, 1, 2, etc.), as defined in the LPSK initialization database.   
• path is a string that provides the executable’s location on secondary storage.  If 
the location has white space, then it must be quoted.  The boot loader in Phase 0 
can read most file systems (e.g., FAT32), so the path can contain typical naming 
conventions and directory structures.  There can be only one PL3 executable per 
partition in Phase 0.  When loaded into memory, the LPSK enforces a policy that 
does not allow other partitions to access the code segment.  The same policy is 
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enforced for the associated stack and data segments.  In addition, all associated 
data and stack segments are not marked as executable. 
 
The next part of the configuration declares any pre-existing application data that needs to 
be loaded into desgs from secondary storage.  The LPSK allows dsegs to have either read 
only (RO), read/write (RW) or no access (NA) permissions associated with them.  In 
addition, it is possible to set RO and RW permissions for applications running in 
partitions other than where the data resides (as long as the permissions do not conflict 
with information flow rules enforced by the LPSK between partitions).  The syntax is as 
follows: 
 
 DSEG[index] = { path, partition, permission+ }; 
 
“DSEG” is a reserved word.  The other parameters in the above syntax are explained 
below: 
• index is an increasing array value starting from ‘0’.   
• path is the directory/name of the file containing the required data.  If the path 
contains white space it must be quoted. 
• partition is the location that the PL3 dseg will be created, and into which the data 
from the above file will be copied. The partition is the “hosting” partition for the 
dseg.  Valid partition numbers are defined in the LPSK initialization database.  
• permission+ is a comma-separated list of per-partition permissions, where the 
first permission is associated with the 0
th
 partition, the second permission is 
associated with the 1
st
 partition, etc.  There must be an assigned permission for 
each partition (as declared in the LPSK initialization database).  The active 
partition to which the dseg is assigned (allocated) cannot have a NA permission to 
that dseg.  If a non-NA permission is given to a partition, then the address space 
of the associated process will be updated to reflect the given permission. 
 
The next part of the configuration declares msegs that are needed by the application.  The 
syntax is as follows: 
 
 MSEG[index] = { size, partition, permission+ }; 
 
“MSEG” is a reserved word.  The other parameters in the above syntax are explained 
below: 
• index is an increasing array value starting from ‘0’.   
• size is the size of the segment needed. The number can be given as the total 
number of bytes or with “KB”, “MB” and “GB” shortcuts, where a kilobyte is 
1024 bytes, a megabyte is 1024KB and a gigabyte is 1024MB. 
• partition is the location that the PL3 segment will be created.  The partition is 
hosting the segment.  Valid partition numbers are defined in the LPSK 
initialization database.   
• permission+ is a comma-separated list of per-partition permissions, where the 
first permission is associated with the 0
th
 partition, the second permission is 
associated with the 1
st
 partition, etc.  There must be an assigned permission for 
SecureCore Software Architecture: SCOS Functional Specification 
             Trustworthy Commodity Computation and Communication 7 
each partition (as declared in the LPSK initialization database).  There must be at 
least one active partition with RW access.  If a non-NA permission is given to a 
partition, then the address space of the associated process will be updated to 
reflect the given permission. 
 
The following is an example of what a PL3 initialization database file might look like.  
The following assumes there are two active partitions (0 and 1) and one passive partition 
(2), as would be defined in the LPSK configuration database. 
 
 # filename: pl3_config.txt 
 # 
 # This file is used to configure PL3 for all partitions. 
 # 
 # Created: 2007-11-07 (P. Clark) 
  
 # The following declares the executables.  The index refers to the assigned 
# partition. 
 CODE[0] = /shell.out; 
 CODE[1] = /emergency.out; 
 
 # Other data segments required by the above applications: 
 #                                                                Partitions 
 #      0      1      2 
 DSEG[0] =  { “/passwords.txt”, 0, RW, NA, NA }; 
 DSEG[1] =  { “/clearance.txt”, 0, RO,  NA,  NA }; 
 DSEG[2] =  { “/contacts.txt”, 1, NA, RW, NA }; 
 DSEG[3] =  { “/stuff.txt”,  2, RO, RO,  NA }; 
 
 # Additional run-time memory required by applications 
 #                                              Partitions 
 #                                             0      1      2 
 MSEG[0] = { 1MB, 0,       RW, NA, NA }; 
 
Note that the DSEG and MSEG declarations are optional; they are only necessary if an 
application requires data and memory that is not compiled with the application 
executable.  Note that there is a maximum number of msegs, and a maximum number of 
dsegs that can be declared for a SecureCore computer.  These are declared in the 
constants MAX_MSEGS and MAX_DESGS, respectively. 
3 PL3 Configuration Database 
This section describes the location and format for the PL3 configuration database 
provided by an instantiation of the SCOS to an application. 
 
A selector to the PL3 configuration database will be passed to an application on its stack. 
After the SCOS has finished initializing itself and the environment, it will perform an 
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initial outer-ring return to the application code.  The application will construct a pointer 
from the passed selector to reference its configuration database. 
 
The following C-code defines the constants and structures of the PL3 configuration 
database.  A variable of type “int” is assumed to be 32 bits, and a variable of type “short 
int” is assumed to be 16 bits.  Some of the types and constants used below assume the 
inclusion of lower-layer header files, e.g., the equivalent of an “lpsk.h”, to be defined at a 
later date. 
 
#define MAX_USERNAME  32 
#define MAX_PASSWORD  32 
 
// Call interface return values 
#define SCOS_AUTH_FAILURE 300 
#define SCOS_LOGIN_BUSY 301 
#define SCOS_INVALID_STRING 302 
#define SCOS_NO_LOGIN  303 
 
// The following structure is the PL3 Configuration DB definition 
// 
typedef struct { 
    unsigned int version   // PL3 database format version 
    device_struct  keyboard;   // Pre-attached keyboard device 
    device_struct  screen;    // Pre-attached screen device 
    unsigned int num_segs;   // # of segments created for app 
    segment_struct seg[MAX_DSEGS+MAX_MSEGS]; 
} application_struct; 
 
The device_struct type provides the major and minor numbers for devices that have been 
logically pre-attached by the LPSK during initialization.  The segment_struct type 
provides a structure that allows the SCOS to pass out dseg and mseg information to the 
application. 
 
The data provided to an application will be a 16-bit selector placed on the stack by the 
SCOS.  The SCOS will then perform an initial outer-ring return to the application.  From 
the point of view of the application, it will appear that execution has returned after 
making a call, with the selector treated as an output of the call.  The selector will appear 
on the stack as shown in Table 1.  The name in the table is informational, and does not 




Table 1. Stack Frame for Outer-Ring Return 
 
The application creates a pointer using the selector with an offset of 0.  The pointer will 
point to the memory layout shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Memory Layout of the PL3 Configuration Database 
 
The dsegs in the configuration database can be uniquely identified by the application by 
referencing the associated path name in the “id” field.  The msegs are identified by the 
order they were given in the initialization database; the same order given in the 
initialization database will be the order given in the mseg array.  Size alone is not a good 
identifier because some msegs may be the same size, but shared in different ways (or not 
at all).  The perms element indicates the permission(s) that the application has been 
assigned for the associated segment, which is either read-only or read-write. 
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4 Native Call Interfaces 
This section describes the native call interfaces provided by the SCOS for applications.  
When implemented, the calls will be made via a gate interface (e.g., a call gate).  The 













The following subsections describe the native call interfaces in detail.  Note that a 
conscious decision was made to not have the SCOS validate input arguments for pass-
through LPSK functions unless there was a specific SCOS-added feature.  Validating 
inputs would unnecessarily impact performance.  The LPSK will make sure security is 
not violated. 
 
The constants referenced in this section are either defined in LPSK or SCOS header files.  
For interfaces that return a success code, if the requested action is successful, then the 
value of NO_ERROR is returned to the caller. 
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4.1 scos_flush_segment 
The scos_flush_segment call is used to write the contents of a memory segment to its 
associated location on secondary storage.  The scos_flush_segment call has the lowest 
implementation priority of all the calls and may not be implemented in Phase 0. 
4.1.1 Prototype 
unsigned int scos_flush_segment( const selector_type selector ); 
4.1.2 Inputs 
• selector 
The input selector references the segment to be flushed to secondary storage. 
4.1.3 Outputs 
• Function Result 
The only output is a numerical value that indicates the success or failure of the 
requested operation. 
4.1.4 Processing 
1. Call scss_flush_segment using the same inputs and outputs given in 
scos_flush_segment. 
2. Return the function result returned by scss_flush_segment. 
4.1.5 Effects 
• If successful, the data on secondary storage will be overwritten with known 
values. 
• If an error occurs during the flush, then the data on secondary storage is in an 
unknown state (i.e., a partial write may occur). 
4.1.6 Errors 
LPSK_NOT_MAPPED 
This error is returned if the memory object referenced by the input selector 
was not initialized from a memory object on secondary storage (i.e., the 
segment is not a dseg). 
LPSK_NO_WRITE 
This error is returned if the requesting subject does not have a write 
permission associated with the dseg to be flushed. 
LSPK_WRITE_FAILURE 
This error is returned if an unexpected write error occurred during the 
flushing of the segment. 
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4.2 scos_read_next 
The scos_read_next call is used to read data sequentially from the requested device, such 
as a keyboard.  The call will return no more data in the input buffer than requested by the 
caller, but it may return less than requested.  The actual number of data units returned is 
provided as an output. 
4.2.1 Prototype 
unsigned int scos_read_next(  
const unsigned int  major, 
const unsigned int  minor, 
const unsigned int num_requested, 
 void  * const buffer, 
 unsigned int * num_read); 
4.2.2 Inputs 
• major 
The major device number.  It is the number that represents the kind of the 
device to read from. 
• minor 
The minor device number.  It is the number that represents the specific 
instantiation of the major device to be read from. 
• num_requested 
The requested number of device-dependent data units (e.g., bytes) to put into 
the memory location pointed to by the input buffer. 
• buffer 
The memory location where a copy of the requested data is to be put. 
4.2.3 Outputs 
• num_read 
The actual number of data units read and copied into the input buffer.  It is 
possible that the number of units read is smaller than the input 
num_requested, which will result in no returned error. 
• Function Result 
A numerical value that indicates the success or failure of the requested 
operation. 
4.2.4 Processing 
1. Call scss_read_next using the same inputs and outputs given in 
scos_read_next. 
2. Return the function result returned by scss_read_next. 
4.2.5 Effects 
• If data is obtained from the requested device, then the data is copied to the 
input buffer. 
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• In the event that an error occurs during the copy operation an error will be 
returned to the caller, but the state of the input buffer will be unknown.  In 
other words, the buffer may contain only a partially requested read operation. 
• If the input buffer provided by the caller points to an area where the 
requesting subject does not have write permission then a general protection 
fault will occur when an attempt is made to copy the requested data into the 
buffer.  The effect in Phase 0 will be an ungraceful shutdown of the system. 
4.2.6 Errors 
LPSK_BAD_MAJOR 
This error is returned if the input major is not a valid major device 
number. 
LPSK_BAD_MINOR 
This error is returned if the input (major, minor) is not associated with an 
attached device. 
LPSK_NO_DATA 
This error is returned if there is no data to read from the device. 
LSPK_READ_FAILURE 
This error is returned if an unexpected read error occurred while reading 
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4.3 scos_read_random 
The scos_read_random call is used to read data from the requested device.  It is used to 
read from devices that can be randomly accessed, such as the screen.  The call will return 
no more data in the input buffer than requested by the caller, but it may return less than 
requested.  The actual number of data units returned is provided as an output. 
4.3.1 Prototype 
unsigned int scos_read_random(  
const unsigned int  major, 
const unsigned int  minor, 
const unsigned int offset, 
const unsigned int num_requested, 
 void * const buffer, 
 unsigned int * num_read); 
4.3.2 Inputs 
• major 
The major device number.  It is the number that represents the kind of the 
device to read from. 
• minor 
The minor device number.  It is the number that represents the specific 
instantiation of the major device to be read from. 
• offset 
The device-specific location to start the read operation from. 
• num_requested 
The requested number of device-dependent data units (e.g., bytes) to read 
from the device, starting at the input offset. 
• buffer 
The memory location where a copy of the requested data is to be put. 
4.3.3 Outputs 
• num_read 
The actual number of data units read and copied into the input buffer. It is 
possible that the number of units read is smaller than the input 
num_requested. 
• Function Result 
A numerical value that indicates the success or failure of the requested 
operation. 
4.3.4 Processing 
1. Call scss_read_random using the same inputs and outputs given in 
scos_read_random. 
2. Return the function result returned by scss_read_random. 
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4.3.5 Effects 
• If data is obtained from the requested device, then the data is copied to the 
input buffer. 
• In the event that an error occurs during the copy operation an error will be 
returned to the caller, but the state of the buffer will be unknown.  In other 
words, the buffer may contain only a partially requested read operation. 
• If the input buffer provided by the caller points to an area where the 
requesting subject does not have write permission then a general protection 
fault will occur when an attempt is made to copy the requested data into the 
buffer.  The effect in Phase 0 will be an ungraceful shutdown of the system. 
4.3.6 Errors 
LPSK_BAD_MAJOR 
This error is returned if the input major is not a valid major device 
number. 
LPSK_NOT_RANDOM 
This error is returned if the input (major, minor) device cannot be 
randomly accessed. 
LPSK_BAD_MINOR 
This error is returned if the input (major, minor) is not associated with an 
attached device. 
LPSK_BAD_OFFSET 
This error is returned if the input offset was invalid for the given device in 
its current state. 
LSPK_DEVICE_END 
This error is returned if the caller attempts to start a read request from the 
end of the randomly addressable space. 
LSPK_READ_FAILURE 
This error is returned if an unexpected read error occurred while reading 
from the device. 
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4.4 scos_write_next 
The scos_write_next call is used to write data to the requested device.  The call will write 
no more data to the device than requested by the caller, but it may write less than 
requested.  The actual number of data units written is provided as an output. 
4.4.1 Prototype 
unsigned int scos_write_next(  
const unsigned int  major, 
const unsigned int  minor, 
const unsigned int  num_requested, 
const void * const buffer
1
, 
 unsigned int * num_written); 
4.4.2 Inputs 
• major 
The major device number.  It is the number that represents the kind of the 
device to write to. 
• minor 
The minor device number.  It is the number that represents the specific 
instantiation of the major device to write to. 
• num_requested 
The number of device-dependent data units (e.g., bytes) to write to the device. 
• buffer 
The memory location of the data to be written. 
4.4.3 Outputs 
• num_written 
The actual number of data units written.  The num_written may be less than 
the num_requested. 
• Function Result 
A numerical value that indicates the success or failure of the requested 
operation. 
4.4.4 Processing 
1. Call scss_write_next using the same inputs and outputs given in 
scos_write_next. 
2. Return the function result returned by scss_write_next. 
4.4.5 Effects 
• If data is written to the requested device, then the state of the device may have 
changed, depending on the device. 
                                                
1
 The use of two const type specifiers means that neither the pointer nor the contents pointed to by the 
pointer can be modified by the called function. 
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• In the event that an error occurs during the write operation then an error will 
be returned to the caller, but the state of the device will be unknown.  In other 
words, a partial write may have occurred. 
4.4.6 Errors 
LPSK_BAD_MAJOR 
This error is returned if the input major is not a valid major device 
number. 
LSPK_BAD_MINOR 
This error is returned if the input (major, minor) is not associated with an 
attached device. 
LPSK_NO_WRITE 
This error is returned if the calling application does not have write access 
to the attached device. 
LSPK_WRITE_FAILURE 
This error is returned if an unexpected write error occurred while writing 
to the device. 
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4.5 scos_write_random 
The scos_write_random call is used to write data to the requested device. It is used to 
write to devices that can be randomly accessed, such as the screen. The call will write no 
more data to the device than requested by the caller, but it may write less than requested.  
The actual number of data units written is provided as an output. 
4.5.1 Prototype 
unsigned int scos_write_random(  
const unsigned int  major, 
const unsigned int  minor, 
const unsigned int offset, 
const unsigned int  num_requested, 
const void * const buffer
2
, 
 unsigned int * num_written); 
4.5.2 Inputs 
• major 
The major device number.  It is the number that represents the kind of the 
device to write to. 
• minor 
The minor device number.  It is the number that represents the specific 
instantiation of the major device to write to. 
• offset 
The device-specific location to start the write operation. 
• num_requested 
The number of device-dependent data units (e.g., bytes) to write to the device. 
• buffer 
The memory location of the data to be written. 
4.5.3 Outputs 
• num_written 
The actual number of data units written.  The num_written may be less than 
the input num_requested. 
• Function Result 
A numerical value that indicates the success or failure of the requested 
operation. 
4.5.4 Processing 
1. Call scss_write_random using the same inputs and outputs given in 
scos_write_random. 
2. Return the function result returned by scss_write_random. 
                                                
2
 The use of two const’s means that neither the pointer nor the contents pointed to by the pointer can be 
modified by the called function. 
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4.5.5 Effects 
• If data is written to the requested device, then the state of the device may have 
changed, depending on the device. 
• In the event that an error occurs during the write operation then an error will 
be returned to the caller, but the state of the device will be unknown.  In other 
words, a partial write may have occurred. 
4.5.6 Errors 
LPSK_BAD_MAJOR 
This error is returned if the input major is not a valid major device 
number. 
LSPK_NOT_RANDOM 
This error is returned if the input (major, minor) device cannot be 
randomly accessed. 
LPSK_BAD_MINOR 
This error is returned if the input (major, minor) is not associated with an 
attached device. 
LPSK_NO_WRITE 
This error is returned if the calling application does not have write access 
to the attached device. 
LPSK_BAD_OFFSET 
This error is returned if the input offset is invalid for the given device in 
its current state. 
LPSK_DEVICE_END 
This error is returned if the caller attempts to start a write operation from 
the end of the randomly addressable space. 
LSPK_WRITE_FAILURE 
This error is returned if an unexpected write error occurred while writing 
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4.6 scos_shutdown 
The scos_shutdown call is used to perform a graceful shutdown of the computer.  When 
the termination is complete an optional message is displayed, followed by a system notice 
advising the user that the shutdown is done.  The computer power is kept on.  This initial 
Phase 0 implementation does not support termination signals to non-TML subjects. 
4.6.1 Prototype 
void scos_shutdown( const char * const
3
 message ); 
4.6.2 Inputs 
• message 
A message to display on the screen. The string must be null-terminated and 




1. Call scss_shutdown using the same inputs given in scos_shutdown. 
4.6.5 Effects 
• All processes are terminated. 
• All non-LPSK processing is stopped. 
• The state of the screen is minimally altered by the system notice.  If the input 
message is a valid pointer to a non-empty string then the screen state is further 
altered. 
• Because termination signals are not supported in Phase 0, a call to 
scos_shutdown from one partition will result in processes in other partitions 
having no opportunity to flush modified segments to disk.  On-disk files may 





                                                
3
 The use of two const’s means that neither the pointer nor the contents pointed to by the pointer can be 
modified by the called function. 
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4.7 scos_powerdown 
The scos_powerdown call is used to perform a graceful power down of the computer.  If 
the computer does not support a software-controlled power down, then the result is the 
same as a call to scos_shutdown with no message.  This initial Phase 0 implementation 








1. Call scss_powerdown. 
4.7.5 Effects 
• All processes are terminated. 
• If software controlled power down is supported, then the computer is powered 
down. 
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4.8 scos_login 
The scos_login call is used to authenticate the user.  It uses a pre-installed password 
database managed by the SCOS to assist in the authentication.  The user-visible 
consequence of a successful login is application dependent.  Only one user may be 
logged in at a time per SCOS instantiation.  Each SCOS instantiation manages its own 
password database, and no communication between SCOS instantiations is performed.  
Therefore, if an SCOS authenticates a user for an application running in a partition, the 
SCOS in a different partition would have no record of that authentication, 
4.8.1 Prototype 
unsigned int scos_login(  
const char * const username, 
const char * const password); 
4.8.2 Inputs 
• username 
The asserted identity.  The string must be null-terminated and cannot exceed 
MAX_USERNAME bytes in length. 
• password 
The password to use as proof of the identity.  The string must be null-
terminated and cannot exceed MAX_PASSWORD bytes in length. 
4.8.3 Outputs 
• Function result 
A numerical value that indicates the success or failure of the requested 
operation. 
4.8.4 Processing 
1. Refer to the SCOS user authentication database to verify that no user is 
currently logged in.  If a user is already logged in then return the 
SCOS_LOGIN_BUSY error.  Otherwise continue to the next step. 
2. Verify that the length of the input username is not greater than 
MAX_USERNAME bytes.  If it does exceed the maximum length, then return 
the SCOS_INVALID_STRING error.  Otherwise continue to the next step. 
3. Verify that the length of the input password is not greater than 
MAX_PASSWORD bytes.  If it does exceed the maximum length, then return 
the SCOS_INVALID_STRING error.  Otherwise continue to the next step. 
4. Obtain the hashed password for the input username by referring to the SCOS 
password database.  If no entry exists for the input username, then return the 
SCOS_AUTH_FAILURE error.  Otherwise continue to the next step. 
5. Hash the input password. 
6. If the hash generated in the previous step is not equal to the hash obtained 
from the password database return SCOS_AUTH_FAILURE.  Otherwise 
continue to the next step. 
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7. Update the SCOS user authentication database to show that the input 
username is logged in. 
8. Return NO_ERROR to the caller. 
4.8.5 Effects 
• The SCOS user authentication database is updated to reflect that the user 




This error is returned if a user is already considered logged in. 
SCOS_INVALID_STRING 
This error is returned if either the input username or input password 
exceeds their maximum length of MAX_USERNAME and 
MAX_PASSWORD, respectively. 
SCOS_AUTH_FAILURE 
This error is returned in one of two cases: 1) The input username does not 
have a matching entry in the password database; or 2) The hashed input 
password is not equal to the hashed password stored in the password 
database for the input username. 
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4.9 scos_who 
The scos_who call is used to query which user (if any) is currently logged in. 
4.9.1 Prototype 





The caller passes in this pointer.  If a user is logged in then the user name will 
be copied to this referenced location, followed by a NULL character (‘\0’).  If 
no user is currently logged in then an empty string will be copied to the 
referenced location (i.e., a NULL character in the first byte).  To avoid 
unexpected behavior, the referenced memory location must have at least 
(MAX_USERNAME + 1) bytes that can be overwritten. 
4.9.4 Processing 
1. Copy the user name from SCOS authentication database to the output 
username.  
2. Return to the caller. 
4.9.5 Effects 
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4.10 scos_logout 
The scos_logout call is used to request the SCOS to log out the current user.  The user-








1. Update the SCOS user authentication database to show that no user is 
currently logged in. 
2. Return to the caller. 
4.10.5 Effects 
• If a user was logged in then the user authentication database is modified to 
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4.11 scos_set_password 
The scos_set_password call is used to change the password for the currently logged in 
user.  It is up to the calling application to ensure the user has provided the intended 
password (e.g., by requiring the user to enter the password twice) and that the person 
providing the new password is the actual user (e.g., by requiring a re-entry of the current 
password).  Phase 0 does not enforce password selection policies.  If the 
scos_flush_segment call is not implemented in Phase 0, then the change will not persist 
across a reboot of the computer. 
4.11.1 Prototype 
unsigned int scos_set_password( const char * const password ); 
4.11.2 Inputs 
• password 
The new password for the currently logged in user.  The string must be null-
terminated and cannot exceed MAX_PASSWORD bytes in length. 
4.11.3 Outputs 
• Function result 
A numerical value that indicates the success or failure of the requested 
operation. 
4.11.4 Processing 
1. Verify that a user is currently logged in by referring to the SCOS user 
authentication database.  If no user is currently logged in, then return the 
SCOS_NO_LOGIN error.  
2. Verify that the length of the input password is not greater than 
MAX_PASSWORD bytes.  If it does exceed the maximum length, then return 
the SCOS_INVALID_STRING error. 
3. Hash the input password. 
4. Replace the hashed password in the SCOS password database that 
corresponds to the logged in user (as noted in the SCOS authentication 
database). 
5. Call scss_flush_segment to update the on-disk copy of the password database.   
6. Return the function result returned by scss_flush_segment to the caller. 
4.11.5 Effects 
• If successful, then the on-disk copy of the SCOS password database is 
updated to reflect a change in a user’s password. 
4.11.6 Errors 
SCOS_NO_LOGIN 
 This error is returned if there is no user currently logged in. 
SCOS_INVALID_STRING 
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This error is returned if the input password exceeds the maximum length 
of MAX_PASSWORD. 
LSPK_WRITE_FAILURE 
This error is returned if an unexpected write error occurred during the 
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5 SP Emulation Call Interfaces 
The SCOS call interfaces that support an SP emulation were originally specified in a 
separate document [4].  However, some changes were made to the interfaces after the 
document was prepared.  Therefore, the current interfaces are provided below, with the 
“scos_” prefix added to the calls.  These “scos_” calls are pass-through calls to the 
equivalent “scss_” calls. 
 
/* general parameters */ 
#define INIT_SIZE 4096  // size of data blob used to save SP hardware state  
 
 
/* define register word size */ 
#define WORD_SIZE 4  // word size of registers in bytes 
typedef unsigned long gpreg_t; 
 
/* define fault types – private – do not check directly */ 
typedef int SPFault; 
 
/* secure memory areas */ 
typedef struct { 
   void *addr; 
   size_t size; 
   unsigned int state;  /* 0 == plaintext, 1 == ciphertext */ 
   gpreg_t hash[4]; 




#define SPArea_DESTROY  1 
#define SPArea_RELEASE  2 
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SPFault scos_SPHW_CEMBuffer_Set (unsigned int sel, gpreg_t *rd); 
SPFault scos_SPHW_CEMBuffer_Get (unsigned int sel, const gpreg_t rs1,  
const gpreg_t rs2); 
SPFault scos_SPHW_BeginCEM_auth (void); 
SPFault scos_SPHW_EndCEM_auth (void); 
SPFault scos_SPHW_SecureArea_Add (void *addr, size_t size); 
SPFault scos_SPHW_SecureArea_Remove (const unsigned int opts, void *addr); 
SPFault scos_SPHW_SecureArea_Store (void *addr); 
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6 End Notes 
This section contains notes for future SCOS phases. 
 
If a future phase allows the SCOS to support more than one application, then the 
processing for call interfaces that accept pointers as inputs and outputs must be expanded.  
In such situations, the SCOS must verify that the pointers belong to the calling 
application, and not to any other application supported by an instantiation of the SCOS. 
 
If a future phase allows the SCOS to support more than one application, some thought 
must be given to a policy regarding the attachment of devices.  If application A attaches a 
device via an SCOS call, then application B should not be able to use it.  Therefore, the 
SCOS must ensure that when an application makes a call that includes the passing of a 
major/minor pair, that the device is attached by the application before allowing the device 
operation to occur.   
 
Much of Section 2 “PL3 Initialization Database” should be moved to a specification for 
the configuration vector tool. 
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